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Behavioral findings in several strategic games indicate that people punish others if they
think they are being treated unequally, even at the cost of minimizing their own material
payoff. We investigated the primary driving force behind such non-self-regarding behavior,
so-called, altruistic cooperation. In all of our studies, a mini ultimatum game was played
either one-shot (in Experiment 1a and 1b) or repeatedly (Experiment 2), and rejections of
inequitable distribution were taken as a measure of altruistic cooperation. In Experiment
1a, we replicated previous findings indicating that the key mechanism contributing to
the emergence of altruistic cooperation is fairness considerations. In Experiment 1b, we
delved into the relative importance of two aspects of fairness considerations (i.e., outcome
fairness and intentions) and showed that both aspects were effective in determining the
level of altruistic cooperation, with the contribution of intentions being more important.
In Experiment 2, we investigated the effect of the opportunity for reputation building and
future interaction on altruistic cooperation. We found that these factors became influential
only when fairness considerations were weakened, particularly, as a result of the removal
of the possible intentions behind an offer.
Keywords: altruistic cooperation,mini ultimatum game, fairness, reputation building, future interaction, intentions
INTRODUCTION
Human altruistic cooperation presents a puzzle from the perspec-
tives of both the standard economic models of the “self-interested
actor” and the evolutionarymodels of the “self-regarding individ-
ual” because it involves some characteristics that are difficult to
reconcile with the predictions of standard game theoretical and
evolutionary analyses. One form of altruistic cooperation is to
reward cooperators (i.e., costly rewarding) and to punish norm
violators (i.e., costly punishment) at a personal cost, even though
the probability that this cost will be repaid (either by third parties
or by that specific agent in the future) is very low (Gintis et al.,
2003)1.
Evidence for the existence of altruistic cooperation largely
comes from laboratory experiments in which the respective
behavioral pattern has been observed through economic games.
One of the best-known economic games used to demonstrate
altruistic cooperation, particularly costly punishment, is the
Ultimatum Game (UG) (Güth et al., 1982). In this game two
players are presented with a sum of money; one of them is
assigned to the role of Proposer while the other one to the role
of Responder. The Proposer is asked to offer any portion of the
money to the Responder. If the Responder accepts the amount
offered, the money is distributed in accordance with the proposal.
If the Responder rejects the offer, both get nothing.
1We acknowledge that there are other forms of altruistic cooperation, such
as cooperation in public goods games without any involvement of punish-
ment of rewarding. However, the main interest of the current studies is
costly punishment in Ultimatum bargaining games as a form of altruistic
cooperation.
According to standard economic theory of self-interest, a ratio-
nal Proposer offers the minimum possible amount, and a rational
Responder never rejects any amount unless it is zero (Binmore,
2007). The underlying assumption in this prediction is that both
parties care only about how much money they get. However, the
vast majority of experimental studies has shown that the modal
offers by the Proposers lie between 40–50% of the total amount
and the Responders frequently reject offers below 25% (Güth
et al., 1982; Roth, 1995; Henrich et al., 2005). This pattern of
results has been replicated cross-culturally (Henrich et al., 2005)
and shown to be robust with large stakes (Cameron, 1999).
The experiments reported here aimed to investigate the dif-
ferential contributions of fairness considerations and perceived
opportunity of reputation building (RB)/future interaction to the
emergence of costly punishment as a form of altruistic coopera-
tion in experimental contexts.
Some researchers argue that the underlying mechanism of
such non self-regarding behaviors in the UG (i.e., high offers by
the Proposers and frequent rejections by the Responders) is not
only to get as much money as possible, but also to maintain fair-
ness norms among players (Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Gintis et al.,
2003). In other words, the players have a preference for fairness,
along with the preference for material benefits (Falk et al., 2008).
In fact, the motivation behind the Proposers’ high offers can be
explained with or without the involvement of fairness considera-
tions: they simply may not want to offer an amount that can be
easily turned down by the Responder, so they are willing to dis-
tribute the money in a relatively fair way. Thus, the Proposers’
main concern still might be getting as much as possible in the
end, rather than treating the Responders fairly (Declerck et al.,
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2009). However, for Responders, the role of fairness concerns is
more apparent and must be stronger because they seem to accept
ending up with nothing rather than being treated unfairly. Even
though the Responders could have been better off by accepting
any amount offered, they prefer to punish the Proposer’s unfair-
ness, at a cost to themselves. This pattern of response indicates
that the Responders engage in costly punishment in response to
the unfairness of the outcome proposed by the Proposer2.
A special version of UG has been used to demonstrate how
much the Responders care about (un)fair intentions of the
Proposers. The structure of the so-called Mini UG (see Table 1)
is the same as the standard UG, with an exception: the Proposer
is again asked to distribute an amount of money but unlike the
standard UG, only in one of two ways. Both players participate
in four consecutive Mini UGs, and throughout all these games
one way of distribution is always fixed while the alternative dis-
tribution is always different across games. The fixed distribution
is a relatively inequitable one (i.e., the Proposer can take $8 for
himself, and offer $2 to the Responder, see Table 1).
However, the available alternative distribution varies in terms
of the outcome fairness, sometimes yielding amore equitable out-
come (i.e., the Proposer can take $5 for himself, and offer $5 to the
Responder, see Table 1), and sometimes yielding an even more
unequal outcome (i.e., the Proposer can take $10 for himself,
and offer $0 to the Responder, see Table 1). Under the standard
assumptions, rejection rates for the fixed distribution (8/2) are
expected to be the same regardless of its alternatives, as its mon-
etary value stays unchanged across games (Falk et al., 2003a).
However, this particular distribution was rejected much more
frequently when the Proposer intentionally ignored the more
equitable alternative distribution [i.e., the (5/5) distribution] than
when he ignored the more unequal alternative distribution [i.e.,
the (10/0) distribution] (Falk et al., 2003a; Sutter, 2007). Thus,
the rejection decisions made by the Responders seem not to be
determined by the absolute amount of the offer (i.e., $2), but by
whether the offer is seen as relatively unfair [i.e., in comparison
to (5/5) split] or fair [i.e., in comparison to (10/0) split]. [See
Table 1 for the perceived fairness of the fixed distribution (8/2)
2We argue that rejections of inequitable distributions in UGs can be inter-
preted as costly punishment because rejection of any non-zero offer (even any
unevenly distributed offer) is (1) costly to the Responder himself because as
a results he ends up with a zero outcome, and (2) a form of punishment to
the Proposer’s unfairness as the Proposer also gets nothing when a rejection is
made.
across four games]. These findings indicate that the Responders
punish the unfairness of the Proposers by rejecting an amount
of money in one case and appreciate the fairness of the Proposer
by accepting the very same amount in another case. It has been
argued therefore that fairness considerationsmust be the underly-
ing motive behind altruistic cooperation, especially in the context
of costly punishment (Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Gintis et al.,
2003).
Although the importance of fairness considerations in such
bargaining games has been widely accepted, the real reasons for
altruistic cooperation (i.e., the Responders’ rejection/acceptance
behaviors in the UG) have been a source of much debate
(Declerck et al., 2009). As mentioned earlier, by rejecting a non-
zero offer, the Responders seem to engage in actions that are
opposite to their self-interest, in order to maintain the fairness
norms between parties. Thus, fairness considerations seem to
override the self-regarding/rational motives.
Confidence in such a conclusion mainly comes from the two
critical features of the above-mentioned experiments: identities
and the decision histories of both players are kept hidden (i.e.,
anonymous) and they will never meet again in another round
(i.e., one-shot encounter). Anonymous and one-shot encoun-
ters eliminate the possibility of reputation building (henceforth,
RB) and future interaction (henceforth, FI) respectively, as poten-
tial sources of this seemingly fairness-driven behavior (Fehr and
Fischbacher, 2003). Involvement of any of these possibilities -
either RB or FI-would be especially critical in this context because
the costly behavior obtained in these experiments could then be
explained within the boundaries of self-regarding motives: it is
rational and adaptive to reject unfair offers if the possibility of re-
encountering the same game partner in the future is high enough
or if the possibility of building a reputation among other players
is at stake. The underlying reason for this claim is that rejecting
unfair offers protects the player from being offered with unequal
distributions by the same game partner in the future or by third
parties, and thus this behavior serves the player’s self-interest
(Burnham and Johnson, 2005; Hagen and Hammerstein, 2006).
This argument goes further in the direction that people engage
in altruistic cooperation in one-shot and anonymous encoun-
ters simply because they confuse the experimental settings with
the more familiar environments where interactions are nor-
mally repeated and non-anonymous (Burnham and Johnson,
2005). In fact, the participants might still be responding to
implicit cues suggesting that future interaction is possible or
that their reputation is at stake. One finding that supports this
Table 1 | General structure of Mini Ultimatum Games.
Mini Ultimatum Games*
(5/5) Game (2/8) Game (10/0) Game (8/2) Game
Possible distributions (8/2) (5/5) (8/2) (2/8) (8/2) (10/0) (8/2) (8/2)
Perceived fairness of the (8/2) distribution Unfair Reasonably unfair** Fair Neutral
*The numbers in the parentheses denote how much the Proposer could get/how much the Responder could get.
**The Proposer seems to have an excuse for offering the more inequitable distribution (8/2), because otherwise he would be unfair to himself [i.e., by offering the
(2/8) distribution, he would give 8 to the Responder, and take 2 himself].
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 252 | 2
Güney and Newell Fairness, reputation, and altruistic cooperation
interpretation is that the presence of eyespots on the computer
desktop, which triggers the sense that participants are being
watched, leads to increased generosity in another money allo-
cation game (Haley and Fessler, 2005). Some other studies sug-
gest that even the perception of being involved in a situation
where FI and RB is possible triggers altruistic cooperation in
one-shot, and anonymously played economic games (Kiyonari
et al., 2000). Thus, behaving in an altruistically cooperative man-
ner in the UGs might not solely result from the concern for
the maintenance of fairness norms, but from the mis-perceived
opportunity of RB and FI (Haley and Fessler, 2005; Bateson et al.,
2006).
In the set of studies reported here, we aimed to investigate
how important these two factors, namely fairness considerations
(in Experiment 1a and 1b) and the possibility of RB and FI (in
Experiment 2), are in the emergence of altruistic cooperation in
general and costly punishment in particular. Experiments 1a and
1b were designed to understand the role of fairness considera-
tions in costly punishment. Note that, as pointed out previously,
fairness considerations have two major aspects, one being related
to outcomes (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels,
2000), and the other to intentions (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger, 2004). Although, several economic models have
been developed with a specific focus on outcome fairness (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), empirical evi-
dence suggests that intentions are just as important as outcomes
(Blount, 1995; Falk et al., 2008) for the maintenance of fairness
norms. This is why we thought it was necessary to incorporate
both of these important aspects of fairness consideration into
our investigation and hence we used the Mini UG, instead of the
standard UG, in all of our experiments.
Previous studies have already established the importance of
intentions behind an action (i.e., offer) in the Mini UG: the (8/2)
distribution is rejected at different levels depending on whether
the alternative distributions are perceived as fair or not (i.e.,
highest rejections observed when the alternative was more equi-
table). However, findings diverge in terms of rejection rates of
the (8/2) distribution when the alternative distribution was more
inequitable. More specifically, 9% of the Responders rejected the
(8/2) distribution in the (10/0) game in Falk et al.’s (2003a)
study whereas almost 28% rejected it in Sutter’s (2007) study.
Considering these differences in previous findings, Experiment
1a was conducted to re-establish the basic phenomenon observed
in the Mini UG (presented in Table 1). We found it prefer-
able to observe the standard rate of rejections in all Mini UGs
in our own subject pool first, in order to provide a standard-
ized baseline before incorporating the subsequent manipulations
(Experiments 1b, 2) (and potential implications to be drawn from
these manipulations).
Experiment 1b was designed to clarify the relative impact of
these two aspects of fairness considerations in the Mini UG. Two
special features of this specific version of UG enable us to separate
the effect of intentions from that of outcomes (Falk et al., 2008):
the Proposer has two available options to distribute the allocated
money, with one option always being more equitable or yielding a
fairer outcome (compared to the other option). Importantly, the
choice of one distribution over the other is under the Proposer’s
full control [except for the (8/2) game, see Table 1]. In order
to differentiate the effect of intentions from the effect of out-
come fairness, we removed the latter feature from the Mini UG
and thus made any potential attribution of intentions impossible,
but kept the former and thus made the evaluation of outcome
fairness possible. If the rejections of the (8/2) distribution are
primarily determined in response to the (unfair) intentions of
the Proposer, then we should not obtain any differences in these
rejections rates across the games because the intentions behind
the offers are not assessable. However, it has been already shown
that the Responders react to the fairness of outcomes as well
(Blount, 1995; Falk et al., 2008). Thus, different rejection rates
among different Mini UGs were expected but this manipula-
tion would enable us to examine if these differences would be as
strong as those observed in Experiment 1a where intentions were
assessable.
In Experiment 2, we aimed to understand the combined effect
of the real possibility of RB and FI in the Mini UG. The main
reason for testing the combined effect of RB and FI was that
in the above-mentioned studies demonstrating fairness driven
responses (i.e., different rates of rejection of an inequitable distri-
bution across Mini UGs), the features of “one-shot-interaction”
and “anonymity” are inseparable. Therefore, it is difficult to iden-
tify whether the obtained responses could actually be the product
of the (mis)perception of one-shot encounters as repeated (and
thus players behave as if re-encountering the same game part-
ner in the future is possible in order to maximize their material
pay-offs) or that of the (mis)perception of anonymous encounters
as non-anonymous (and thus Responders behave as if building a
reputation among other players is possible in order to maximize
their material pay-offs). Thus, incorporation of both possibili-
ties of RB and FI through repeated and non-anonymous game
play would make the two previously mentioned explanations
(fairness-driven responses via one-shot/anonymous encounter vs.
self-regarding responses via misperceived one-shot/anonymous
encounter) commensurable. A second and even a more explicit
reason was that the possibility of RB and FI are highly interre-
lated (i.e., repeated encounters with the same partner, by default,
bring along the opportunity of building reputation as each player
would know what the other player has done so far).
We predicted that if the main reason behind the rejections
in one-shot and anonymously played games is the misperceived
possibility of RB or FI, then an increase in the level of altruis-
tic cooperation should be expected when the actual possibility of
RB and FI is added to the context. Although such an additional
effect of the possibility of RB and FI has not been investigated in
the Mini UG, there are two main reasons for expecting such an
increase. First, the importance given to equality is expected to be
elevated (Rottemberg, 2008) because the equality norm (i.e., dis-
tributing the allocated money evenly) is strengthened in presence
of the possibility of RB and FI (Hertel et al., 2002). Second and
more importantly, the sanctions inflicted upon the unfairness of a
game partner through altruistic cooperation might be considered
as an effective tool for maximizing future gains (Kiyonari et al.,
2000).
The structure of Mini UG allows us to examine how the possi-
bility of RB and FI, along with the fairness concerns, contributes
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to the Responders’ rejections especially when costly punishment
is expected to take place (i.e., when the alternative offer yielded
a more equitable distribution). In addition, in the Mini UG,
there is one special game [the (8/2) game, see Table 1] in which
the Proposer has no choice, but to offer the fixed amount. This
particular case would enable us to detect the sole effect of the
possibility of RB and FI on the Responders’ decisions when an
unequal distribution was offered without any (un)fair intentions
of the Proposer involved. For all these reasons, to the best of our
knowledge, Experiment 2 is the first attempt to understand the
effect of the real possibility of RB and FI on costly punishment,
particularly in the presence and absence of Proposer’s intentions.
EXPERIMENT 1A
We expected the rejection rate of the (8/2) distribution to be dif-
ferent across different Mini UGs. More specifically, the highest
rejection rate was expected to be in the (5/5) game. In addition
we expected to find statistically significant differences between the
rejection rates of the (8/2) distribution in the (5/5) and the (10/0)
games.
METHOD
Participants
Fifty first year psychology students (M age = 19.5, 36 female) at
UNSW participated in the experiment as a part of their course
requirement, and were informed that they would be paid, con-
tingent on the outcome of their choices. UNSWHuman Research
Ethics Advisory Panel approved the study.
Procedure
There were 10 experimental sessions in total, and five participants
were tested at a time in each experimental session. Participants
were seated in separate rooms and their identities were kept hid-
den throughout the whole experiment. All participants played the
Mini UG as the Responders since our main interest was to see
whether we would be able to replicate the choice pattern of the
Responders obtained in previous studies (i.e., Falk et al., 2003a).
However, each participant was told that only one participant in
each group of five would be assigned to the Responder role and
that the rest would be playing as Proposers. This procedure made
them believe that the offer in each game would come from an
actual but different participant (Proposer) rather than from the
computer. The offers made by the computer mimicked the actual
rate of proposals offered by real Proposers in the study of Falk
et al. (2003a). For instance, in that study, the (8/2) distribution
was offered by 31% of the Proposers in the (5/5) game, and 73%
in the (2/8) game. Thus, the Responders in Experiment 1a were
offered the (8/2) distribution with the probability of 0.31 in the
(5/5) game, and that of 0.73 in the (2/8) game. The participants
played the games for real money, but currency was defined as
Monetary Unit (MU), where 1 MU was equal to 0.5 AUD. The
experiment was conducted and run with the Runtime Revolution
Software.
Design
The Responders participated in all four Mini UGs presented in
Table 1. They were asked to indicate their acceptance/rejection
decisions for each of the two possible distributions in each game
before hearing the actual distribution offered [see Falk et al.
(2003a) for further information regarding this strategy method].
For example, in the (10/0) game, the Responders were asked
whether they would accept or reject if the Proposer offered them
the (10/0) distribution instead of (8/2); and they were subse-
quently asked whether they would accept or reject if the Proposer
offered the (8/2) distribution instead of (10/0). If the game was
(8/2), they were simply asked what they would do if the Proposer
had no choice but to offer the (8/2) distribution. Once the
Responders indicated their rejection/acceptance decision for each
possible distribution, they simply moved on to the next game.
After the completion of all four games, the Responders were
informed about the overall outcomes and debriefed about the real
set-up of the experiment (i.e., the offers were not made by actual
proposers). The presentation order of the Mini UGs and that of
the possible distributions in each game were randomized.
RESULTS
Table 2 shows the rejection rates of (8/2) distribution in differ-
ent games. The main pattern observed in the previous studies
(i.e., Falk et al., 2003a; Sutter, 2007) was replicated in our par-
ticipant pool. To test the overall rejection rate differences across
four games, we ran Cochran’s Q-test. The test confirmed that the
rejection rates of the (8/2) distribution were significantly differ-
ent across four games (p < 0.0001). The rejection rate of the (8/2)
distribution in the (5/5) game was the highest among four games.
McNemar change tests were performed for the pairwise compar-
isons and they showed that the rejection rate in the (5/5) game
was significantly higher than that of the (10/0) (p < 0.0001).
The rejection rate of the (8/2) distribution was also significantly
higher in the (5/5) game than in the (2/8) and the (8/2) games,
p= 0.049, and p < 0.0001, respectively. In addition, the differ-
ences between the (2/8) and the (8/2) games, and the (2/8) and the
(10/0) games were significant, p= 0.001 and p= 0.004, respec-
tively. These results confirmed the previous findings that the
rejections to an (unfair) offer were not determined by the abso-
lute amount of money, but by how fair or unfair that offer was
perceived in comparison to the other available offers3.
EXPERIMENT 1B
Our main manipulation in this experiment was to eliminate the
possibility of any attributions to intentions of the Proposer. To do
so, the participants were informed that there were two distribu-
tions to be offered but that the actual offer would be determined
by a random mechanism (Blount, 1995). Thus, the decision was
not under the Proposer’s full control, and therefore, it was impos-
sible to evaluate the intentions behind the offer (Falk et al.,
2008). When the fairness of intentions cannot be evaluated, the
response should then only be determined by the outcome fair-
ness if fairness considerations are the underlying force behind
the Responder’s responses. Thus, we expected that the rejec-
tion rates of the (8/2) distribution would still vary depending
only on the relative fairness of the alternative outcomes but the
3The rejection rates for the alternative distributions (5/5), (2/8), and (10/0)
were 2%, 6%, and 82%, respectively in Experiment 1a.
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Table 2 | Rejection rates (in percentages) of (8/2) distribution across
games in Experiment 1a (N = 50), 1b (N = 45), and 2 (N = 96).
Rejection rates of (8/2) distribution
(5/5) (2/8) (10/0) (8/2)
Game (%) Game (%) Game (%) Game (%)
Experiment 1a 60 42 18 14
Experiment 1b 37 33 15 22
Experiment 2
R1 58 58 33 74
R2 62 21 25 42
R3 37 45 8 62
R4 50 30 25 17
Average 52 38 23 49
R1, R2, R3, and R4 correspond to Round 1, Round 2, Round 3, and Round 4 of
Experiment 2, respectively. Percentages reported for the row “average” are the
rejection rates collapsed across rounds of Experiment 2.
differences across games should not be as large as they were in
Experiment 1a [i.e., the rejection rate of the (8/2) distribution in
the (5/5) game should not be as high as it was in Experiment
1 because now the alternative (5/5) offer was not intention-
ally ignored in the same way that the unequal (8/2) was not
intentionally offered]. However, the rejection rates of the (8/2)
distribution should still be the highest in the (5/5) game because
the (5/5) distribution yields a more equitable outcome for each
player.
METHOD
Forty-five first year psychology students (M age = 19.8, 20
female) at UNSW participated in the experiment in return for a
course credit. They were paid in accordance with the outcome of
their decisions. The design and procedure of the experiment were
almost the same as that of Experiment 1, with two exceptions.
First, the participants were told that the offer of the Proposer
would be determined by a coin flip [i.e., if it came up heads,
the Proposer was going to offer the (8/2) distribution, other-
wise the (5/5) distribution in the (5/5) game]. Second, the actual
offer was indeed determined randomly [i.e., the (8/2) distribu-
tion was offered by the computer with probability of 0.5 in each
game]. UNSW Human Research Ethics Advisory Panel approved
the study.
RESULTS
The rejection rates of the (8/2) distribution across games are
shown in Table 2. The rejection rates were only weakly differ-
ent across four games, (p = 0.055, Cochran’s Q-test). The only
significant difference in terms of the rate of rejections for the
(8/2) distribution within the games was between the (5/5) and
the (10/0) games (p = 0.04, McNemar change tests) 4. Cross-
experimental analysis showed that the (8/2) distribution was
4The alternative distributions (5/5) and (2/8) were rejected by only 1
Responder in each game while the (10/0) distribution by 78% of the
Responders in Experiment 1b.
rejected in the (5/5) game less frequently in Experiment 1b than
in Experiment 1a, χ2 (1, N = 95)= 4.57, p = 0.033.
The results demonstrated that when the intentions of the
Proposer were not assessable, (1) rejection rates of the (8/2) dis-
tribution significantly decreased when its alternative was a more
equitable one [i.e., (5/5)], and (2) the overall difference in the
rejection rates of the (8/2) distribution across four games was
not strongly significant. Even then, however, the rejection rates
were still not identical across the four games. This is an indication
that these rejections were shaped by how unfair the outcome was
perceived in comparison to the outcomes yielded by the alterna-
tive distributions. Overall, these results support the idea that two
aspects of fairness considerations are involved in the emergence of
costly punishment, but the contribution of the intention aspect of
fairness considerations seems greater, especially when the alterna-
tive distribution yields a more equitable outcome [i.e., the (5/5)
game].
EXPERIMENT 2
In order to test the effect of the real possibility of RB and FI
we changed the structure of the Mini UG from being one-shot
and anonymously played to being iterated and non-anonymously
played. We predicted that the rejection rates of the (8/2) distri-
bution in the Mini UG should be (1) even higher (than in the
one-shot, anonymous version) when its alternative was the (5/5)
distribution because it is adaptive to build the reputation that one
is a tough bargainer who rejects unfair offers, and (2) even lower
when its alternative was the (10/0) distribution because it is adap-
tive to give the message for future interactions that one is capable
to discern and will reward fair intentions.
METHOD
Participants
One hundred and ninety-two first year psychology students (M
age= 19.76, 120 female) at UNSWparticipated in the experiment
as a part of their course requirement and were informed that they
would be paid depending on the outcome of their choices. Four
participants were tested in each experimental session and there
were 48 experimental sessions5 in total. UNSW Human Research
Ethics Advisory Panel approved the study.
Instructions phase
First, the participants were randomly allocated to their roles,
(with 2 being Proposers, and the other 2 being Responders)
and warned against revealing their allocated roles to the others.
Individual players were then given detailed verbal instructions
5We ran these 48 sessions in two separate blocks of 24 sessions. The second
block of 24 sessions was conducted after one of the anonymous referees asked
us to collect more data for this experiment. The demographics of participants
in the two testing blocks was very similar and participants were tested by the
same experimenter in the same laboratory. The data from these two blocks of
sessions were first analysed separately to checkwhether patterns of responding
were the same across sessions. This was confirmed via statistical analysis show-
ing no significant differences in overall rates of rejection across the two session
blocks. Thus data from both sessions was combined for the analyses presented
in the body of the paper. Please see Footnote 8 for the details regarding the
results of statistical analysis.
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(along with a written instructions document) regarding the gen-
eral structure of the game play, what their roles required them
to do, and what the consequences of their accept/reject decisions
would be. They were informed that they would play the game
for more than one round with the same partner, and that their
decision would be announced to other players right before they
switched their partners. However, the players were not given any
information about (1) the possible distributions available to the
Proposer in Mini UGs [i.e., in order to eliminate the possibility
of the (un)fairness of subsequent offers confounding the players’
current decisions], (2) how many rounds they would play in total
(i.e., in order to make the “shadow of the future” long enough),
and (3) when exactly they would switch partners (i.e., in order
to make the possibility of RB stronger). In order to eliminate a
potential wealth effect, the participants were told that the over-
all amount that they would receive would be determined by a
coin flip at the end of the experiment. If the coin toss came up
heads, then they would get paid the amount that they earned in
the first half of the experiment, and if tails, the amount earned
in the second half (please see the Appendix section for the com-
plete instructions). Afterwards, the instructions documents were
collected, and the players were taken to the separate rooms to
complete a short quiz (included in Appendix) measuring whether
all the instructions were understood clearly.
Design
Each experimental session consisted of four consecutive rounds
and in each round the participants played a different Mini UG
game [i.e., the (5/5) game in Round 1, the (8/2) game in Round
2 and so on. Note that the allocation of the games into partic-
ular rounds was randomized] 6. Each player was matched with
his/her first game partner (i.e., Proposer 1 with Responder 1)
before Round 1 and played two consecutive rounds (e.g., Round
1 and Round 2) with the same partner. After the completion of
Round 2, they switched their partners (i.e., Proposer 1 started
playing with Responder 2) and played the following two rounds
(Round 3 and Round 4) with their new partners. At the end of
each round, the decisions of both players (and the resulting out-
comes) were announced to the players. These announcements
were done privately (i.e., only between the pairs) after Round 1
and after Round 3; but publicly (i.e., to all players) after Round
2 and Round 4. For example, the decisions of Responder 1 and
Proposer 1 were announced only to these two players after they
completed Round 1, but their overall decisions in Round 1 and
Round 2 were announced to all players just before they switched
their partners.
Game play
In all Mini UGs, the Proposer was asked to choose one of
the two available distributions (see Table 1). Simultaneously the
6In order to eliminate a potential confounding sequence effect, we kept the
round order of four Mini UGs different in each experimental session. Initially,
there were 24 (i.e., 4! = 24) possible different orders, and thus we ran 24 ses-
sions with a different sequence of Mini UGs in each. As we stated above, we
later conducted another block with 24 experimental sessions as requested by
one of our referees. For that reason, each of those 24 sequences had to be
realized twice in total in the experiment.
Responder, without knowing what the Proposer had chosen to
offer, was asked to indicate his/her acceptance/rejection decisions
for each of the two possible distributions. (If the Responder had
accepted the offer that the Proposer had chosen, the amount
was distributed in accordance with the proposal. Otherwise, both
got nothing). Both players were informed about the outcome
right after the game was over, and then they moved on to the
next game. The currency in the experiment was defined in MUs,
where 1 MU equals 0.5 AUD. The experiment was conducted
and run with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). After the game play
was over, both players received a questionnaire that was simul-
taneously prepared on the basis of the players’ actual decisions
in the experiment. The Proposers were asked to indicate why
they offered the amount they offered and the Responders were
asked for each game why they rejected/accepted the (8/2) dis-
tribution (please see the Appendix section for the respective
questionnaires).
RESULTS
All participants passed the quiz distributed before the game play,
thus all responses were included in the analysis. We first exam-
ined the extent to which the possibility of RB and FI influenced
the Responders’ overall rejection rates of the (8/2) distribution
in each game in order to see how the opportunity of RB and FI
could change this overall rejection pattern in each game. Table 2
(the bottom row) presents the rejection rates of the (8/2) distri-
bution in different games, collapsed across rounds. The highest
rejection rate was obtained in the (5/5) game and the lowest in the
(10/0) game. These rejection rates of the (8/2) distribution were
significantly different across four groups (p < 0.0001, Cochran’s
Q-test)7. Interestingly, almost half of the participants rejected the
(8/2) distribution in the (8/2) game. McNemar change tests indi-
cated that the rejection rate in the (5/5) game was significantly
higher than that in the (10/0) and the (2/8) games, p < 0.0001,
and p = 0.035, respectively, but not than those in the (8/2) game,
p = 0.758.
A cross-experimental comparison demonstrated that the rejec-
tion rates of the (8/2) distribution between Experiment 1a and
Experiment 2 did not significantly differ in the (5/5) games
[χ2(1, N = 146) = 0.83, p = 0.36], the (2/8) games [χ2(1, N =
146) = 0.16, p = 0.68], and the (10/0) games [χ2(1, N = 146)
= 0.47, p = 0.49]. Contrary to our expectations, the rejection
7The rejection rates of the alternative distributions in the (5/5), (2/8), and
(10/0) games were as follows: the (2/8) distribution was rejected by 3%, and
the (5/5) distribution by 2%. Almost 91% rejected the (10/0) distribution.
8As stated in the Method section, we collected additional data from 96 par-
ticipants (i.e., in an additional 24 sessions with four participants in each) in
accordance with the suggestion of one of our anonymous referees. We ran
additional statistical analyses in order to detect if there was any significant dif-
ferences between these two blocks of 24 sessions (i.e., between the initial 24
sessions and the second 24 sessions). In particular, we compared these two
separate blocks in terms of the overall rejection rates obtained in each Mini
UG, and we found no significant differences. For the (5/5) game, the rejection
rates were 52% vs. 52%, [χ2(1, N = 96) = 0.00, p = 1]; for the (2/8) game
41% vs. 35%, [χ2(1, N = 96) = 0.40, p = 0.53]; for the (10/0) game 18%
vs. 27%, [χ2 (1, N = 96) = 0.94, p = 0.33]; and for the (8/2) game 50% vs.
48%, [χ2 (1, N = 96) = 0.04, p = 0.84] in the first block and second blocks,
respectively.
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rates of the (8/2) distribution did not increase when the alter-
native distribution was (5/5), and did not decrease when the
alternative distribution was (10/0). However, the (8/2) distri-
bution was rejected in the (8/2) game much more frequently
in Experiment 2 than Experiment 1a, χ2(1, N = 146) = 15.14,
p = 0.0001. Similar patterns of differences were obtained in
the comparison of Experiment 1b and Experiment 2. No sig-
nificant differences were found between Experiment 1b and
Experiment 2 in terms of the rejection rates of the (8/2) dis-
tribution in the (5/5) [χ2(1, N = 141) = 2.49, p = 0.11] 9, the
(2/8) [χ2(1, N = 141) = 0.36, p = 0.55], and the (10/0) games
[χ2(1, N = 141) = 1.00, p = 0.32]. However, rejection rates for
the (8/2) distribution were much higher in Experiment 2 than
Experiment 1b in the (8/2) game, χ2(1, N = 141) = 8.61, p =
0.003. We will return to the interpretation of these results in the
General Discussion10.
We then investigated round by round rejection rates in all
games of Experiment 2. The rationale of the round-wise analy-
sis was (1) to investigate the reason behind the unexpectedly high
levels of rejections in the (8/2) game, and (2) to see the effect
of the possibility of RB and FI more clearly. We first focused on
patterns (in rejections) indicating any type of signaling from the
Responders to the Proposers, in terms of what Responders would
not like to be offered. Even though it was possible to see the effect
of RB and FI in all four rounds (i.e., because the players did not
know howmany rounds they would play in total nor when exactly
they would switch partners, they should have incentive to build
reputation for future interactions in all rounds), the rates of rejec-
tions of the (8/2) distribution were especially important in Round
1 and Round 3. Because the Responders would have a chance
to give a message to their newly matched partners, they would
(presumably) perceive these rounds (1 and 3) as the most suit-
able time to signal their preferences to their game partners for the
following rounds. Figure 1 depicts the rejection rates (in percent-
ages) of the (8/2) distribution across four rounds in each game of
Experiment 2.
For the analysis of round by round rejection patterns, we first
conducted a logistic regression by including dummy variables
for different rounds, and correcting the standard errors for the
clustering on participants (i.e., because we had independent sam-
ples for round-wise comparisons but matched samples for four
9Note that the cross-experimental comparison between Experiment 1a and
1b demonstrated that the rejection rates of the (8/2) distribution in the (5/5)
game were significantly lower when the intentions of the Proposer were not
assessable. Thus, if the effect of RB and FI is dependent on the absence of
intentions, then we would observe significantly higher rates of rejections in
Experiment 2 as compared to Experiment 1b for the (5/5) game. Even though
this expectation was met (i.e., rejection rates were 33% in Experiment 1b and
52% in Experiment 2), the respective difference was not statistically significant
(p = 0.11), presumably due to the relatively low number of observations in
Experiment 1b (n = 45).
10Due to the variation in proportion of female andmale participants in all our
experiments, we checked to see if there was any effect of gender in general, or
gender by Mini UG interaction on rejection rates of the (8/2) distribution.
Even though male participants tended to reject the (8/2) distribution more,
there was no significant main effect of gender, p = 0.42, p = 0.35, p = 0.14 in
Experiment 1a, 1b, and 2, respectively. Also, there was no interaction effect of
gender and the type of Mini UG.
Mini UGs). Afterwards, we tested the pairwise round differences
for each game. Table 3 demonstrates the round by round differ-
ences in all games and both the across-rounds and the pairwise
significance levels. For the (5/5) game, there was no significant
differences across rounds in terms of the rejection rates of the
(8/2) distribution [LRχ2(3,N = 96)= 3.39, p = 0.33]. A similar
pattern obtained in the (10/0) game as well: except for the differ-
ence between Round 1 and Round 3 [LR χ2(1, N = 48) = 3.92,
p = 0.05]. The rate of rejections in the (2/8) game in Round 1 was
significantly higher than in Round 2 [LR χ2(1, N = 48) = 6.52,
p = 0.01], but not in Round 3 than Round 4 [LR χ2(1, N = 48)
= 1.39, p = 0.24]. However, the rejection pattern for the (8/2)
game was different: the rejection rates of the (8/2) distribution
were especially high in Round 1 and Round 3 (see Figure 1). The
(8/2) distribution was rejected much more frequently in Round
1 than Round 2 [LR χ2(1, N = 48) = 5.18, p = 0.02], and in
Round 3 than Round 4 [LR χ2(1, N = 48) = 9.31, p = 0.0002].
This pattern indicates that the effect of RB and FI was especially
prevalent in the (8/2) game.
We also compared the round-wise rejection rates of the (8/2)
distribution in each game in Experiment 2 with the rejection rates
in the corresponding games in Experiment 1a and Experiment
1b (see Table 4 for complete lists of significance values revealed
through comparisons of round-wise rejections in Experiment
2 with Experiment 1a and 1b for each game). Nevertheless,
such analyses did not reveal anything different than the above-
mentioned results demonstrating the null effect of RB and FI on
rejections, except for the (8/2) game. For the (5/5) and the (10/0)
games, the rejection rates of the (8/2) distribution in none of the
rounds in Experiment 2 were significantly different than those in
Experiment 1a and 1b. For the (2/8) game, only the rejection rate
in Round 1 of Experiment 2 was marginally higher than that of
Experiment 1b (p = 0.05). However, for the (8/2) game, rejection
rates of the (8/2) distribution, especially in Round 1 and Round
3 were significantly higher in Experiment 2 than those in both
Experiment 1a and 1b (see the last two columns of Table 4).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In Experiment 1a, we confirmed that people (negatively) respond
to intentional unfairness in a Mini UG at a cost to their own
material payoff. The difference in the pattern of results between
Experiment 1a and 1b showed the relative impact of the aspects
of the fairness consideration in shaping altruistically coopera-
tive behaviors. We found that when a distribution yielding an
unequal outcome between players was intentionally offered in
the presence of a more equitable distribution [i.e., the (5/5) dis-
tribution], that distribution was rejected much more frequently
(i.e., in Experiment 1, 60%) than when it was unintentionally
offered (i.e., in Experiment 1b, 37%). This pattern of results indi-
cates that from the perspective of the Responder, the intentions
of the Proposer matter significantly. However, even when the
intentions of the Proposers are not involved, another aspect of
the fairness considerations is still present: it is the (un)fairness
of the outcome distribution that governs the Responders’ rejec-
tion behavior. The rejection rates of the unequal distribution were
changed depending on the relative equitability of the alternative
distribution.
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FIGURE 1 | Rejection rates of the (8/2) distribution across rounds in
each game in Experiment 2. Each bar in the figure represents percentage
of Responders (out of 24) who rejected the (8/2) distribution in
corresponding games. R1, R2, R3, and R4 correspond to Round 1, Round
2, Round 3, and Round 4, respectively. Error bars represent the 95%
Confidence Interval.
Table 3 | Significance levels (i.e., p-values) of across-round and
pair-wise round differences in rejection rates of the (8/2) distribution
obtained through logistic regression analysis for each Mini UG.
Significance levels of the differences (p-values) across rounds in
Experiment 2
Comparisons (5/5) Game (2/8) Game (10/0) Game (8/2) Game
All rounds 0.33 0.05 0.27 0.001*
R1 vs. R2 0.76 0.01* 0.53 0.02*
R1 vs. R3 0.15 0.39 0.05 0.35
R1 vs. R4 0.56 0.04* 0.52 0.0002*
R2 vs. R3 0.08 0.08 0.14 0.15
R2 vs. R4 0.38 0.51 1.0 0.07
R3 vs. R4 0.39 0.24 0.14 0.0023*
For example, the intersection of the first column and the third row corresponds
to the significance level of difference between Round 1 and Round 3 in terms
of the rejection rates of the (8/2) distribution in the (5/5) game. The rejection
rate was 58% in Round 1 and 37% in Round 3 in the (5/5) game (see Table 2),
and these rates did not significantly differ, p = 0.15. [*] sign corresponds to
significant differences (i.e., p < 0.05).
In the literature, there are two distinct approaches to the
fairness preferences over material benefits (Falk et al., 2008).
These are the intention-based approach to the fairness concept
(Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004) in which the
emphasis is on the (fair/unfair) intentions behind an offer; and
the outcome-based models (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000) in which the fairness is interpreted as the
consideration of ending up with equitable material payoffs. Our
results demonstrated that these two aspects of fairness consid-
erations are differentially effective in determining the decisions
of players. Thus, these findings provide convincing support for
the idea that the economic models of preference for fairness that
exclusively focus either on the intentions or on outcome fairness
fail to capture altruistically cooperative behavior as a whole (Falk
et al., 2008). Our results are rather compatible with the models
that take both intentions and concerns for equitable outcomes
into account (i.e., Falk and Fischbacher, 2006).
However, contrary to our predictions, the results of
Experiment 2 indicated that the additional effect of the
possibility of RB and FI did not lead to an increase in altruistic
cooperation: rejection rates of the (8/2) distribution did not
change when the Responders were expected to punish unfair
offers (i.e., the 5/5 game) or to appreciate fair offers (i.e., the 10/0
game). Cross-experimental comparisons of the rejection rates
obtained in Experiment 1a (i.e., involving both intention and
outcome fairness) and Experiment 1b (i.e., involving outcome
fairness only) with the overall rejections rates in Experiment
2 (i.e., involving RB and FI opportunity along with fairness
considerations) confirmed that there were no changes in the
rejections of an inequitable distribution in the (5/5) and the
(10/0) games when the possibility of RB and FI was incorporated
in to the context.
Two potential but competing explanations of this pattern
of results can be offered. One is that the possibility of RB
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Table 4 | Significance levels (i.e., p-values) of differences in rejection rates of the (8/2) distribution obtained through the comparison of each
round of Experiment 2 for each Mini UG with Experiment 1a and Experiment 1b for corresponding Mini UG.
(5/5) Game (2/8) Game (10/0) Game (8/2) Game
Experiment 2 Experiment 1a Experiment 1b Experiment 1a Experiment 1b Experiment 1a Experiment 1b Experiment 1a Experiment 1b
R1 0.89 0.10 0.19 0.05* 0.15 0.09 0.00* 0.00*
R2 0.84 0.06 0.08 0.28 0.48 0.34 0.01* 0.09
R3 0.07 0.98 0.75 0.31 0.28 0.40 0.00* 0.00*
R4 0.42 0.33 0.29 0.72 0.48 0.34 0.76 0.58
For example, the intersection of the fourth column and the second row reads the significance level (0.28) of the difference between the rejection rate obtained
in Round 2 of the (2/8) game in Experiment 2 (i.e., 21%—see Table 2) and the rejection rate obtained in the (2/8) game in Experiment 1b (i.e., 33%). [*] sign
corresponds to significant differences (i.e., p < 0.05).
and FI is indeed (mis)perceived in one-shot and anonymously
played games, and thus did not lead to any differences in the
pattern of responses when it was explicitly incorporated into
the context (Haley and Fessler, 2005; Bateson et al., 2006).
The other is that the explicit incorporation of the possibil-
ity of RB and FI did not have any additional effect on the
responses in the presence of the influence of fairness consider-
ations (that are already effective enough to determine the rates
of rejection). Unexpectedly high rejection rates of the (8/2)
distribution observed in the (8/2) game in Experiment 2, as
well as the round by round analyses of these rejection rates in
each game strongly provide supporting evidence for the latter
explanation.
The possibility of RB and FI led to an increase in the overall
rejection rates only in a particular game where the intention of
the Proposer was not assessable [the (8/2) game], but not in the
other games in which the intentions were assessable [the (5/5),
the (10/0), and the (2/8) games] (please see Table 2). This is the
first indication of the effect of RB and FI being too weak to over-
come the effect of fairness considerations. The Responders might
only be taking the perceived intentions of the Proposers into con-
sideration as a determinant of their accept/reject decisions for an
unequal offer, and thus might not need to have additional rea-
sons/concerns to change those decisions even when RB and FI are
possible.
Round-wise analyses of the games in Experiment 2 support
the claim that the possibility of RB and FI per se was not effec-
tive in changing the rejection responses, especially when the
intentions were assessable: there was no variation across rounds
in terms of the rejection rates of the (8/2) distribution, espe-
cially in the (5/5) and (10/0) games 11. However, the effect of
11Here one could argue that if the opportunity of RB and FI was effective only
in the absence of intentions [i.e., in the (8/2) game], why then were the rejec-
tion rates in Round 1 marginally significantly higher than those in Round 2
in the (2/8) game—a pattern that indicates an effect of RB and FI in the pres-
ence of intentions. Note that the effect of RB and FI was still not strong in this
particular game: First, the overall rejection responses for the (8/2) distribu-
tion did not differ with or without the involvement of RB and FI [compare
the overall rejection rates in Experiment 1a, 1b, and 2 for the (2/8) game, rows
1st, 2nd, 8th in Table 2]. Second, the difference between Round 3 and Round
4 (see the last row of the 2nd column in Table 3) was not significant in terms
of the rejection rates. This is a further indication that the effect of RB and FI
was not strong.
RB and FI did become effective once the fairness consideration
is weakened as a result of the removal of the possible inten-
tions behind an offer in the (8/2) game: it makes the Responders
overly react against the unfairness of the outcome of the (8/2)
distribution, most likely, in order to increase the possibility of
being treated fairly in the future (Kiyonari et al., 2000; Hertel
et al., 2002). This interpretation is mainly supported by the com-
parison of the rejection rates obtained in the (8/2) game across
rounds in Experiment 2. The round-wise analysis of Experiment
2 (see Figure 1) showed that the rejection rates were signifi-
cantly higher both in Round 1 (than Round 2) and Round 3
(than Round 4) only in the (8/2) game, where the intentions of
the Proposer was not assessable. As stated previously, these two
rounds were particularly important for the Responders to con-
vey their message for future encounters. The implicit message
given under such condition could be that they do not like to
be offered an unequal distribution by the same or the next game
partner in the following rounds. The Responders’ self-reports col-
lected after the game play also confirmed that the main purpose
of the rejections in this game was indeed to tell the Proposers
that “I will reject again if you ever propose such an unequal
distribution.”
The results indicate that the absence of fairness intentions
was the primary reason for the possibility of RB and FI becom-
ing effective. However, the comparison between Experiment 1b
and Experiment 2 revealed the importance of “outcome fair-
ness” aspect of fairness considerations as well. This is because,
except for the (8/2) game, the rejection rates of the (8/2) dis-
tribution obtained in none of the games were significantly dif-
ferent between Experiment 2 and Experiment 1b. This finding
implies that even the presence of outcome fairness [i.e., per-
ceived fairness of the (8/2) distribution relative to its alternative
distribution] itself is strong enough to make the rejection rates
reach a certain level—a level that could not get increased [i.e.,
for the (5/5) game] or decreased [i.e., for the (10/0) game]
by the explicit incorporation of RB and FI. The possibility of
RB and FI matters only when there is no intention behind
the distribution offered, and there is no (more equitable or
inequitable) alternative distribution to be offered [i.e., the (8/2)
game].
These results shed light on when and how the possibility of RB
and FI influence the responses in bargaining games. The possibil-
ity of RB and FI is normally expected to increase the rejections
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in the Mini UG as the Responders want to build the reputation
of being a “tough bargainer.” This is why such opportunity has
been sometimes thought to be the source of conflict (i.e., reduc-
tion in overall pay-off-wise efficiency) in strategic environments
(Falk et al., 2003b). Our findings suggest that the possibility of RB
and FI can lead to the respective conflict only when the fairness
intentions are not assessable (i.e., the absence of the evaluation of
intentions seems to increase the rejections in Mini UG, and thus
leads to a “zero” outcome for both parties).
The current set of studies demonstrates the importance of
fairness considerations, especially that of (un)fair intentions, in
interactive economic decisions, particularly in the ultimatum bar-
gaining games. Themain conclusion drawn from the experiments
reported here is that when both outcome and intention fair-
ness considerations are involved in decisions they have a strong
combined effect on the emergence of costly punishment as a
form of altruistic cooperation, and thus override the potential
influence of RB and FI. When an important aspect of fairness
concerns, namely intentions, are absent, RB and FI may play an
important role.
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APPENDIX
A. INSTRUCTIONS
Interactive decision making in economic games
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. This
experimental session consists of several parts. It’s as follows:
1. Instructions for the experiment and assignment of the roles
2. Quiz
3. Actual experiment
4. Questionnaire
(The experimenter asks participants to follow the written instruc-
tions while she is giving the instructions verbally)
• In this study, you will be playing an economic game for
several rounds.
• This is a two-person interactive game where “interactive”
means each of you will be paired with a game partner.
• Since you are four participants here, there will be two
groups containing two players in each.
• In this economic game, one of the players is the PROPOSER
and the other one is the RESPONDER. So that means two
of you will be playing as a Proposer and two of you as a
Responder.
(Assignment of the roles)
• As you see, there are four cards on the table, each con-
taining one role written on one side of each (i.e., Proposer
1, Proposer 2, Responder 1, Responder 2, respectively). I’ll
now turn the cards over, shuffle them and then you will
pick one card randomly. Please do not reveal your role to
the others afterwards. Note that you will keep these roles
throughout the whole experiment.
• Rules of the game are as follows. Please listen carefully and
make sure you understand what your role requires you to
do. If you have any questions, please ask the experimenter
immediately.
(Rules of the game)
• In the beginning of each round, the Proposer will be given
an amount of money, say $10. Then the Proposer is asked
to divide this amount between himself and the Responder
in either of ONLY two ways. For example, the Proposer can
choose an option where he gives $6 to the Responder and
take $4 for himself, OR, he can choose the other option
where he gives $3 to the Responder and take $7 for himself.
The Proposer can choose either way but cannot invent a new
way of distributing the money. After the Proposer chooses
to offer one of the two ways of distribution, he waits for the
Responder’s decision.
• Meanwhile, the Responder, being aware of the Proposer has
two possible ways of distributing the given amount, is asked
to indicate his decisions for each possible way of distri-
bution. For example, the Responder will indicate his/her
acceptance/rejection decision both for the $6 offer, and for
the $3 offer.
• If the Responder accepts the offer, the amount is distributed
in accordance with the proposal. If the Responder rejects
the offer, both the Proposer and the Responder gets noth-
ing. For example, if the Responder accepts the $3 offer,
he gets $3 and the Proposer gets $7. If the Responder
rejects this offer, both the Proposer and the Responder gets
0 (zero).
• However, the Responder makes these decisions before he
learns what the Proposer has actually offered. After the
Responder makes his decisions, he learns the real offer. So,
the Responders will either get the offered amount (if he
has already accepted the offer) or nothing (if he has already
rejected the offer).
• After both players learn the outcome of current round, they
will move on to the next round (if the current round is not
the last round).
(Important details about the experimental procedure)
• However, there are some other important rules that you
must know in order to play the game properly.
• As you have been already told, there are several rounds in
this experimental session. In each round, the structure of
the game mentioned above will remain the same, but the
possible ways of distribution (offers available to be offered!)
will be different from round to round.
• Each group (consisting of one Proposer and one Responder)
will be playing the same games at the same time. For exam-
ple, every group will simultaneously play, say Game X, in
Round 1 and Game Y in Round 2 etc.
• After you play more than one round with the same partner,
you will switch partners at some point. For example, if you
are a Proposer, you will be matched with the Responder of
the other group, and be playing with this new game part-
ner in the following rounds. Your previous partner will be
matched and be playing with the Proposer of the other
group in the following rounds as well.
• You will get notified just before you start playing with a new
partner.
• Before you switch your partner, your previous decisions
will be announced publicly (to all players in the exper-
imental session). For example, if you are a Responder,
whether you have accepted or rejected the previous offers
will be announced to all players (the Proposer and the
Responder in the other group, your game partner and
you) at this announcement stage. That also means that
your next game partner will know what you have done
so far.
• Do not forget that you will be playing with real money
(given by the experimenter). However, currency in the
experiment is defined as Monetary Units (MUs). 1 MU
equals $0.5 (AUD). For example, if you win 10 MUs, you
will be paid $5 (AUD).
• In the beginning of each round, the Proposers will be
endowed with a fixed amount of MUs.
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• At the end of the experimental session, you will get paid in
accordance with your earnings that you get either through
the first half of the experiment, or through the last half. This
will be determined by a coin-flip. For example, suppose that
you’ve played 10 rounds in total. If the coin toss comes up
heads, then you will receive the amount that you earn in the
first five rounds, otherwise in the last five rounds.
• These are the instructions that you need for the experiment.
Now you will take a quiz, which measures how well you
understand these instructions.
B. QUIZ
Please answer to the following questions.
a. How many groups are there in the experiment?
b. What will happen if the Responder rejects the offered amount?
c. What will happen if the Responder accepts the offered
amount?
d. Are you going to play only one Round or more?
Yes ___ No ___
e. 10 MUs equal to $ ___ (Please fill in the blank).
f. Will your previous offers/decisions be announced to other
players at some point during the experiment? If so, when?
Yes ___ (Please indicate below when) No ___
g. Are you going to play with the same game partner throughout
the whole game? If not, what will happen?
Yes ___ No ___ (Please indicate what will happen then)
h. How many players will there be in each group?
i. Will you get paid at the end of the experiment?
j. If the Proposer offers 4 MUs out of 10 MUs to the Responder,
and
• if the Responder accepts the offer, the Proposer takes ___
MUs, and the Responder gets ___ MUs.
• if the Responder rejects the offer, the Proposer takes ___
MUs, and the Responder gets ___ MUs.
k. Do you know how many rounds in total you will play? If yes,
please indicate how many.
Yes ___ (Please indicate how many) No ___
l. Were your roles randomly assigned? If not, how?
Yes ___ No ___ (Please indicate how)
C. QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PROPOSERS
(Former brackets were filled in with the actual offers by the Proposer,
and the latter with the alternative offers in corresponding rounds)
• In the first round, you offered [. . . ] MUs instead of [. . . ]
MUs. Why? Please answer below.
• In the second round, you offered [. . . ] MUs instead of [. . . ]
MUs. Why? Please answer below.
• In the third round, you offered [. . . ] MUs instead of [. . . ]
MUs. Why? Please answer below.
• In the fourth round, you offered [. . . ] MUs instead of [. . . ]
MUs. Why? Please answer below.
Please indicate your
Age:
Gender:
Thanks for your participation. Please see the experimenter for
getting paid (and debriefing).
D. QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RESPONDERS
[Former brackets were filled in with the actual decisions (either
accept or reject) by the Responder, and the latter with corresponding
rounds in that particular session.]
• Why did you [(reject)/(accept)] 2 MUs when its alternative
was 5 MUs in the [. . . ] round? Please explain below.
• Why did you [(reject)/(accept)] 2 MUs when its alternative
was 8 MUs in the [. . . ] round? Please explain below.
• Why did you [(reject)/(accept)] 2 MUs when its alternative
was 0 MUs in the [. . . ] round? Please explain below.
• Why did you [(reject)/(accept)] 2 MUs when its alternative
was 2 MUs in the [. . . ] round? Please explain below.
Please indicate your
Age:
Gender:
Thanks for your participation. Please see the experimenter for
getting paid (and debriefing).
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